In Lebanon, everything and nothing has changed since 2000. Israel attacks Lebanon

Twenty-six years ago this week, Israel was forced to end its 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon. Much has changed since then, yet Lebanon and Israel still cling to the same policies that dragged them into today’s war, which has engulfed Iran and the United States and now threatens the global economy.

Palestine remains the central issue resonating throughout the region and the world. This history is why Israel began attacking pro-Palestinian forces in Lebanon in the 1970s, years before Hezbollah was formed, and why local conflict has increased since then. Iran’s support of Hezbollah after 1982 turned Lebanon into a front line between Iran and Israel; Today, as the United States is fighting Israel, that front has turned into a regional war. At its centre stands Hezbollah, the central pillar of the Iran-backed “axis of resistance” that opposes Israeli-American hegemony.

Lebanon may seem like a laggard.

In this regional and global framework, Lebanon may seem like a laggard. But it certainly deserves more scrutiny because it was and remains the spark that expanded 78 years of Israel-Lebanon-Palestine friction into today’s regional war.

A lot has changed in Lebanon since 2000. Advanced missile, drone and radar technology now shapes the balance of power, above all the growing ability of Iran and Hezbollah to evade US-Israeli air defences. Lebanon’s economy has shattered, its people have been repeatedly driven from their homes, and Israel has devastated towns and villages across the south, highlighting the principle of urban destruction that was created in Beirut’s Dahiyah in 2006 and later implemented in Gaza. Hezbollah was hit hard but has been reborn as a leaner, more agile force that has once again thwarted Israel’s campaign to subdue Lebanon or create a more permanent security zone within it.

The regional picture has also changed. Syria’s role as Hezbollah’s link with Iran has collapsed, and Iran has also been harmed by the US-Israeli attack. Yet Tehran is determined to include Lebanon in any regional agreement that ends the war. The United States has openly sided with Israel, pressuring President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to “disarm” Hezbollah and remove the long-standing threat to Israel, or otherwise potentially face a Gaza-style destruction of all of Lebanon. Other powers, including China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan and Russia, have pressured Iran in different ways to end the war and restore peace and Lebanese sovereignty.

Amid this political storm, many of the conditions of the pre-2000 era persist in Lebanon. The population disagrees about Hezbollah’s role as an armed movement that offers the only effective resistance to Israel. The government appears unable to act politically or militarily due to lack of funds, domestic consent, or military dominance. Occasionally it bows to Israeli or American pressure: to “disarm” already marginalised Palestinian camps or to meet with Israeli officials in Washington under the auspices of Washington’s pro-Israel bias.

Washington has also tied financial aid for Lebanon’s reconstruction to Beirut’s compliance with US-Israeli conditions. Its pro-Israel bias is evident in its readiness to ignore Israeli violations of the two previous ceasefires and in formally supporting Israel’s right to attack any Lebanese it deems a threat while denying the same right to any Lebanese threatened by Israel.

The Lebanese government also feels the pressure of a disaffected, desperately poor population that is increasingly fed up with Israeli attacks that, in 2026 alone, have killed more than 3,000 people, forcibly displaced 1.2 million people and devastated dozens of villages and small towns. It justifies its negotiations with Israel as an effort to compensate for its military losses, to use US pressure to stop attacks, and to allow Beirut to re-establish sovereign control over all its lands.

Rising above these old and new dynamics is a historical reality: Iran and Hezbollah, with the support of foreign allies, withstood a devastating Israeli-American attack and twice forced their more powerful, nuclear-armed adversaries to accept a ceasefire and renew negotiations, first on Iran in early April, then a few days later on Lebanon. The Lebanon ceasefire is now meant to translate into a broader US-Iran deal. Both ceasefires appear to weaken the US-Israeli position in the region, deal a deep political blow to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and create new diplomatic leverage for Iran, Hezbollah and their allies.

What lessons can we learn from all these events? Perhaps that military power, no matter how brutal or genocidal, cannot dictate the realities in the Middle East forever. Buffer and “security” zones, new Israeli settlements, local pro-Israel allies, military checkpoints, constant airstrikes, and the whole US-backed Israeli drama – all of these may become a thing of the past if current trends continue.

It is still unclear how a new diplomatic balance will emerge in Lebanon. But Iran and Hezbollah, having survived their “survivalist” battles, are now pressing for a permanent ceasefire, which could weaken Israel’s position and help reshape Lebanon’s internal dynamics. Ideally, such a development could lead Hezbollah, the Beirut government, and all Lebanese to agree on a serious long-term approach to mutually beneficial relations with an Israel that fully respects Lebanese sovereignty.

If that happens, it will put pressure on all sides to impartially resolve the central issue that they have ignored for 78 years and that has fuelled the perpetual war: Palestinian rights. Only mature and decisive diplomacy, along with legitimate defence strategies, will determine whether current trends lead to the desired outcome.