Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL’s newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe’s eastern neighbourhoods.
I’m RFE/RL Europe editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I’m focusing on two issues: the EU enlargement “Super Tuesday” and Ukrainian civil detainees held by Russia.
EU Enlargement’s ‘Super Tuesday’
What You Need To Know: On June 15, the EU celebrated what Brussels officials dubbed “Mega Monday” with the bloc finally opening accession talks with both Ukraine and Moldova, following a blockage that had lasted a couple of years. The EU also closed two accession chapters with Montenegro, marking the halfway line in wrapping up talks with the small Balkan country, which has completed 16 out of 33 policy chapters needed to become member 28 of the bloc.
Now, on July 14, we will have what is being referred to in Brussels corridors as “Super Tuesday”, a reference to the biggest single day of voting in the US presidential primary election cycle. In a sense, it is very much a continuation of what happened last month. Montenegro will close two additional chapters; Albania will close three, the first ones since Tirana managed to open talks on all 33 back in 2024/2025. Ukraine and Moldova will move forward as well by opening two more chapters — taking their tally to seven out of 33.
Deep Background:
While Brussels will be triumphant that day and present it as yet another exhibit that the bloc, after many years of enlargement fatigue, is finally serious about adding more members for the first time since Croatia joined back in 2013, there are frustrations behind closed doors. Moldova, Ukraine, the European Commission, and the majority of EU member states would have preferred to have all chapters opened by now. In fact, both Kyiv and Chisinau are ready, at least technically speaking. Now, it is all about politics. The 33 chapters are divided into six clusters and, after having opened cluster one, known as the “fundamentals” as it contains the important rule of law issues that will be “closed” at the very end of the process, the two countries will now only open cluster 6, which is seen as the easiest one as it only contains two chapters that deal with foreign policy issues. Ukraine is nearly completely aligned with the EU on foreign policy, even though it still sometimes doesn’t sign up to the bloc’s statements on countries known as the “global south” to secure more international support for its war efforts against Russia. Kyiv also hasn’t fully ratified the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute. For Moldova, the foreign policy alignment isn’t as impressive as Ukraine’s, as it hasn’t complied with all EU sanctions on the Kremlin — notably some trade restrictions, as it still has a certain economic dependency on Russian imports. The hope now is that the four remaining clusters can be opened by October even though some EU officials that RFE/RL has spoken to believe that the outcome is doubtful. Firstly, the new Hungarian government, while willing to start talks with Kyiv, has signalled to Brussels that there is no need for “fast tracking.” EU officials familiar with the file have told RFE/RL that anti-Ukrainian sentiment is still considerable in Hungary and that there is a reluctance to open too much too soon.
Drilling Down:
While not openly stating it, the officials who spoke to RFE/RL suggested that the Czech Republic and Poland are also “comfortable” supporting Hungary’s opposition to fast-tracking Ukraine’s EU accession, even if they don’t say so publicly.
There are also fears in Brussels that the current Polish-Ukrainian spat over history could affect how quickly Warsaw is willing to proceed with Ukraine’s EU accession.
Poland has indicated that one more cluster, number 3, could be approved soon. The remaining three, however, contain issues such as agriculture and transport — areas which Poland and some other eastern EU member states believe Kyiv can economically undercut neighbouring EU countries by offering cheaper goods and services and therefore will be trickier to green light.
The question will be how long Ukraine and Moldova remain coupled in this process, as other EU capitals don’t have the same issues with Moldova. For now, EU diplomats say that Kyiv and Chisinau will initially proceed at different speeds when all clusters and chapters are opened. But if Ukraine becomes stuck throughout the fall, it could happen faster.
But it is not only Moldova and Ukraine that are frustrated. Montenegro aims to close all its remaining chapters by the end of this year and was banking on closing three chapters before the Brussels summer vacation, which starts at the end of July and continues throughout August.
But Croatia still exercises a veto over one of those it hoped to have closed already: chapter 14, dealing with transport. The issue concerns the practice known as “cabotage”, which is the right of carriers, such as trucks from one EU country, to carry out transport within another EU member state. Cabotage is permitted within the bloc but is limited and Zagreb fears that Montenegrin transport companies could offer much lower prices.
There was also one more issue that threatened to derail “Super Tuesday” and could resurface in the near future — Serbia. Last week, the European Commission sent out a document, seen by RFE/RL, that stated that Serbia had made sufficient progress in areas such as rule of law, media freedom, and even alignment with EU sanctions.
The European Commission therefore recommended that cluster 3 for Serbia should be opened now — marking the first positive EU accession move for Belgrade since late 2021
Several countries such as Austria, Germany, France, and Italy have pushed for Serbia to open more chapters, arguing that it is a key country in the Western Balkans; that the steps that it has made, albeit small ones, should be encouraged; and that Brussels must do more to push it out of Moscow’s orbit.
Several countries, led by Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Sweden, were, however, unimpressed by what they saw as the European Commission’s attempt to sugarcoat Serbia’s alleged reforms in these fields.
They also pointed to the commission’s own, scathing rule-of-law report on Serbia from just a month ago in which it slammed Belgrade on numerous issues.
For now, Serbia will not move forward. But don’t rule out that the willingness of some EU member states to push forward with Belgrade might lead to “quid-pro-quo vetoes” on other EU candidate countries in the future if they don’t get what they want.
EU Focusing On Ukrainian Civil Detainees In Russia
What You Need To Know: For years, the European Union and the wider international community have focused on securing the return of Ukrainian children abducted by Russia, using both diplomacy and sanctions on those responsible. In parallel, in 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin, primarily for “the unlawful deportation” of children, which kept the issue in focus.
Until now, there has been less focus on civilian Ukrainian detainees held by Russia — in other words, regular Ukrainian citizens (not children or prisoners of war) deprived of liberty by Russian forces or Russian occupation authorities in areas of Ukraine under Moscow’s political control. This category includes people held without charge; civilians prosecuted under Russian law or the de facto laws applying in Crimea or the parts of eastern Ukraine that Russia currently holds; or those who have been forcibly transferred to the Russian Federation.
Deep Background: The number of such cases is hard to estimate, but the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) believes that there are at least 1,800 ongoing civilian detentions. Ukrainian prosecutorial data has identified more than 15,000 people detained or formerly detained since the full-scale invasion in 2022, although civil society organisations in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe believe that the real number could be higher than 20,000. EU foreign ministers debated the issue for the first time during a July 13 breakfast, co-chaired by Ukraine and Ireland, which currently holds the six-month rotating EU presidency, ahead of their monthly EU foreign affairs council that same day. The outcome was that the EU capitals will create a joint platform with Ukraine and other interested governments, such as Canada’s and Norway’s, as well as relevant NGOs to coordinate joint actions in the future.
Drilling Down:
In parallel, the foreign ministers also approved the first-ever sanctions on people involved in these detentions. Seven of those people that will be slapped with a visa ban and asset freeze are employed in Penal Colony No. 10 in the Russian region of Mordovia, where Brussels contends that Ukrainian civilians are held and, in some cases, mistreated and tortured.
A further nine senior officials and personnel from the Russian penitentiary system operating in the occupied territories of Ukraine will also be blacklisted.
The EU also approved a statement on July 13 in which it “strongly condemns Russia’s systematic refusal to confirm the identity, location, and fate of Ukrainians held in captivity or reported missing, in violation of its obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and calls upon all States to intensify coordinated pressure on Russia to fulfil these obligations without further delay.”
EU officials that RFE/RL has been in touch with on the issue note that Russian occupying forces often use what is known as “filtration processes” after seizing Ukrainian territory, in which they question people about their political views and family ties to identify and potentially prosecute civilians who are loyal to Kyiv and willing to undermine the new regime.
Among those targeted are mostly local officials and community leaders, but also journalists, teachers, religious leaders, and relatives of serving Ukrainian soldiers. Many of them here remain isolated from families or independent monitors and have very limited access to lawyers.
Both Kyiv and Brussels note that these civilian detainees are used as political leverage and are part of the Russian-Ukrainian prisoner exchanges that sometimes occur — even though they aren’t combatants. The dilemma is that while Ukraine wants these people released, they find it unfair to exchange them for captured Russian soldiers that have been part of an invading force.
What lawyers and officials from Ukraine and several Western states are doing in the meantime is to try to document as many cases as possible that later can be referred to international courts, notably the special tribunal for crimes of aggression that is currently being established.
Many of the actions may very well amount to war crimes. If legal experts can establish “wider systematicity”, it could amount to crimes against humanity.
Looking Ahead
EU ambassadors hope to agree on the EU’s 21st sanctions package when they assemble in Brussels on July 15. The package has already been watered down considerably compared to the original proposal presented in early June, but the bloc still hopes to reach an agreement before the summer break, for example, on several black listings and a freeze at $44 per barrel for the Russian oil price cap.
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