Germany’s recent decision to summon the Chinese ambassador following reports that Russian soldiers may have been trained in China has renewed scrutiny of Beijing’s support for Moscow’s war against Ukraine.
For Christopher Walker, vice president of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), the reported training does not represent an isolated development. Rather, he argues, it reflects a broader pattern of cooperation among authoritarian governments that increasingly work together across diplomatic, economic, military and information domains, even without a formal alliance.
In an interview with RFE/RL, Walker discusses China’s support for Russia’s war effort, the evolving relationships among Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran, and why democracies need a sustained, long-term strategy to compete with authoritarian powers.
Germany has summoned the Chinese ambassador over intelligence reports that Beijing may have trained Russian soldiers. Does this move represent a significant new development?
Christopher Walker: I think it’s fair to say that China has afforded the Russian war effort in Ukraine systematic backing, and so it probably shouldn’t come as such a giant surprise that the Chinese authorities apparently have elected to provide support of this kind to the Russian war effort. As other observers have noted, China’s support really has been pivotal to Russia’s war effort.
Does Beijing’s role now extend well beyond diplomatic support to becoming an essential economic and logistical partner for Moscow?
Walker: I think China has tried to have it both ways by signalling through its information and propaganda channels that it seeks to operate as an honest broker or as some sort of bystander, but its actions and support betray that idea, both in terms of this latest news relating to the apparent support for Russian soldiers who were trained and then went on to fight in Ukraine and also in economic terms, in the provision of spare parts, diplomatic backing, and information and propaganda support.
I think these regimes, in part because they lack the democratic consent of their own populations, fear their own populations.
This development is, in a sense, part of a package of support that China has been providing to Russia effectively since the full-scale attack on Ukraine began [in February 2022]. Moreover, the relationship that has evolved between Russia and China dates back even further. One could argue about Xi Jinping’s arrival as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and other top leadership positions in 2012 and Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency around the same time.
Over time, they forged a very close relationship… They have met quite possibly up to about 70 times, either in person or virtually, since Putin returned to office and Xi Jinping assumed the top leadership position in China. They really have reached what we’ve described as a shared consciousness in the way they approach the wider world.
A recent CEPA report examines the evolving relationship between Russia, China, and Iran. To what extent have these governments developed a coordinated strategic partnership, and how does that affect the US-led alliance system?
Walker: Well, they may not be extensively synchronised. What they’ve arrived at is a working relationship where they provide support on an as-needed basis among these different powers.
As we note in the report, it isn’t always seamless cooperation, and it isn’t limitless. But on important tracks of activity relating to economic support, energy support, or, in certain instances, military support — we can’t forget that Iran was providing drones to Russia at scale to attack Ukraine over an extensive period of time.
All of these regimes, I think, see the benefit of working together in a meaningful way. In many respects, certainly from the vantage point of 15 or 20 years ago, I think this relationship has evolved in an unanticipated way to the extent that the regimes in Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing work quite effectively together, even if it isn’t technically synchronised.
Your report notes that these governments often cooperate without the kind of formal institutional structures found in NATO. Should policymakers view that flexibility as a weakness, or would it be a mistake to assume that the absence of a formal alliance limits their ability to cooperate effectively?
Walker: Well, it is in its own ways a bit of both.
I think these regimes, in part because they lack the democratic consent of their own populations, fear their own people. Let’s not forget that the Iranian regime has, in recent months, killed thousands and thousands of its own people. Russia brutalises its own citizens in various ways, leading tens of thousands to choose to leave the country. China likewise runs arguably the most efficient techno-authoritarian machinery of any country on the planet.
So, these are countries whose leadership clearly fears their own publics. In that sense, they are fragile.
But at the same time, it would be irresponsible for the US and other free societies to take lightly the arrangement that has developed among these countries. In a sense, they are providing each other with surge capacity [the ability to quickly provide support when needed] and the kinds of benefits that come through collaboration — benefits that democratic countries themselves should seek to achieve.
Some policymakers argue that Russia’s growing economic dependence on China could eventually create tensions within their relationship, effectively making Moscow the junior partner. Do you see that imbalance as a vulnerability the West can exploit, or is their shared opposition to the US likely to outweigh those differences?
Christopher Walker: Well, I think the current picture of the relationship between the leaderships in Beijing and Moscow is that their antipathy toward the West and desire to see the US weakened are both present and likely to endure.
At the same time, Vladimir Putin is mortgaging his country’s future in part by making it a far weaker, dependent partner in the relationship with China.
Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) walks with Chinese President Xi Jinping during meeting in Beijing in May.
So, to the extent that creates fissures within the ruling elites in Russia, I think that’s desirable in this context. Whether we can expect things to develop quickly in the near term, I think that would be imprudent and irresponsible, because these regimes are there for life. They have no intention of leaving, and they behave accordingly.
Such an approach requires, in my view, the sort of long-term, sustained commitment from the West and the US to contest these rivals that we face. These competitors are investing on multiple levels with an eye toward weakening the US. I think we and our natural allies need to prepare for that competition over the longer haul.
Beyond military and economic cooperation, both Beijing and Moscow continue to invest heavily in global media and information activities. Analysts have often described Russian and Chinese information strategies as distinct, with Russia focused on disruption while China promotes a longer-term narrative about governance and international order. Increasingly, however, are their information efforts reinforcing one another?
Walker: I think the relationship that has evolved over a protracted period of time between the information apparatuses in Russia and China now has overlap, whether that’s by design or simply by coincidence, and we have to take it seriously in either case.
Christopher Walker, vice president of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
For example, in Latin America today there is significant overlap in narratives promoted by both Chinese state media and Russian state media. Those narratives have, over recent years, also reinforced messaging coming from the regimes in Caracas and Havana.
In that sense, you are clustering media activity operating from authoritarian sources across Spanish-speaking countries throughout the region.
We see versions of this playing out in parts of sub-Saharan Africa as well as the Middle East.
We have to take this issue seriously because if you’re not competing, it almost stands to reason that the team that’s on the field, investing resources and playing harder, is going to have an advantage.
These narratives, which include consistent questioning of US prestige, come in different forms from both Russian and Chinese state media sources. This works to the strategic disadvantage of the US and deserves greater attention and sustained commitment.
How successful have Russia and China been in shaping public opinion in regions such as Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, particularly regarding Russia’s war against Ukraine?
Walker: If we use Russia’s war against Ukraine as one indicator, it’s striking to see the extent to which audiences in different parts of the world — including but not limited to sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America — view that conflict.
Russia is unambiguously the aggressor. It launched an unprovoked attack against Ukraine. Yet that is not the perception in large parts of the world. That is due, at least in part, to the systematic dissemination of information and arguments from sources directed and managed by Beijing and Moscow that almost invariably frame events in that way.
I think we must take this seriously, because if it can happen in that instance, it can certainly happen with other issues, including how the US is portrayed.
This behaviour is not new. The Chinese and Russian states have been undertaking these global efforts for years — going back well over a decade in the modern context — and I think this is something we need to take very seriously.
